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ARTICLES
McConnell v. FEC Jurisprudence and Its
Future Impact on Campaign Finance
TREVOR POTTER*
I. THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT OF 2002
In March 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 ("BCRA").' BCRA has two primary components. First, it
bans soft-money donations (i.e., donations not in compliance with
amount limits, source prohibitions, and reporting requirements) to
national political party committees (e.g., the Democratic National Com-
mittee ("DNC"), Republican National Committee ("RNC"), and the Sen-
atorial and Congressional Campaign Committees).2 Prior to the passage
of BCRA, parties raised unlimited amounts of soft money, which they
used not only for party-building activities such as get-out-the-vote
efforts, candidate recruitment, and administrative expenses, but also
increasingly for candidate-specific activities, including broadcast
advertising.
The second primary component of BCRA prohibits corporations,
trade associations, and labor organizations from financing "election-
eering communications" using treasury funds.3 An electioneering com-
munication is any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which
refers to a clearly identified federal candidate, is made within thirty days
of a primary election or sixty days of a general election, and is targeted
to the candidate's state or district.4 A corporation, trade association, or
labor union political action committee ("PAC") may, however, finance
* Trevor Potter is the President and General Counsel of the Campaign Legal Center and a
Member of the Washington, D.C. law firm Caplin & Drysdale. He served as a Commissioner of
the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") from 1991 to 1995 and as Chairman of the FEC in
1994. Mr. Potter is a Republican and was appointed to the FEC by President George H.W. Bush.
He is an expert in campaign finance law and consulted with the congressional sponsors of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA") while they were developing the legislation.
Mr. Potter also served among the counsel representing the sponsors of BCRA as intervening
defendants in McConnell v. FEC. Marianne Viray, J. Gerald Hebert, Paul S. Ryan, and Catie
Hinckley of the Campaign Legal Center also assisted with the preparation of this article.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
2. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a) (Supp. II 2002).
3. See id. § 441b(a), (b)(2) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
4. See id. § 434(0(3) (Supp. II 2002).
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electioneering communications using limited, disclosed "hard-money"
contributions from certain employees or members.5 BCRA also requires
any person who spends in excess of $10,000 on electioneering commu-
nications during a calendar year to file disclosure reports listing the per-
son(s) making or controlling the disbursements, all contributors who
gave more than $1,000 to finance the communications, and those to
whom disbursements of more than $200 have been made.6
Prior to BCRA, despite the long-standing federal ban on corporate
or union spending in federal elections,7 ads attacking federal candidates,
paid for with corporate or labor union money, were broadcast without
restriction on the theory that ads which did not "expressly endorse" a
federal candidate could not be regulated by the campaign finance laws.8
1I. MCCONNELL V. FEC: DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiffs immediately began filing lawsuits challenging the consti-
tutionality of BCRA after it was signed into law by President George W.
Bush on March 27, 2002. 9 More than eighty plaintiffs were party to ten
different lawsuits challenging virtually every provision of the law.' °
5. A corporation, trade association, or labor organization may establish a separate segregated
fund PAC to make political contributions, expenditures, and payments for electioneering
communications, for which the entity may solicit voluntary contributions from certain employees
or members. See id. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
6. See id. § 434(f)(1)-(2) (Supp. II 2002).
7. Restrictions on the use of corporate treasury funds to influence elections date back to
1907, when Congress adopted a law prohibiting corporations from contributing directly to
candidates for federal office. See Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864. In 1947,
Congress augmented the federal prohibition of corporate contributions with a prohibition of
corporate expenditures in connection with federal elections. At the same time, Congress extended
the prohibition of federal election contributions and expenditures to labor unions. See Labor
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 304, 61 Stat. 136.
8. The U.S. Supreme Court, in its landmark Buckley v. Valet decision, narrowly construed
two vague statutory phrases-"relative to a clearly identified candidate" and "for the purpose of
... influencing" a federal election-both of which underlie the statutory term "expenditure," to be
limited to communications that include explicit words of advocacy of election or defeat of a
candidate. 424 U.S. 1, 13, 42-44, 63 (1976).
9. Statement by President George W. Bush upon Signing H.R. 2356, 38 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 517 (Mar. 27, 2002).
10. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). The lead plaintiffs in these lawsuits
included: ACLU, Victoria Jackson Gray Adams, et al., AFL-CIO, Chamber of Commerce, Emily
Echols, et al., National Rifle Association, National Right to Life Committee, Congressman Ron
Paul, select national and state political parties, and Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY). See id.
Provisions that were challenged in court included: the national party soft-money ban, state party
soft-money spending restrictions, hard-money financing requirements for corporate and labor
electioneering communications, coordination provisions, prohibition on political contributions by
minors, hard-money limit increases, and fundraising allowances for candidates facing wealthy
self-financing opponents. Id. Three websites assisted in following the McConnell litigation. See
generally The Campaign Legal Center, http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org (last visited Sept. 28,
2005); Campaign Finance Materials, Stanford Law School, Robert Crown Law Library, http://
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The plaintiffs in these actions, consolidated into McConnell v. FEC,'
encompassed the political range from the RNC and the Christian Coali-
tion to the California Democratic Party and the U.S. Public Interest
Research Group. The Department of Justice and the FEC were the
defendants, with Senators McCain and Feingold and Congressmen
Shays and Meehan, the Act's principal congressional sponsors, as "inter-
venor-defendants" in the suit. 2
McConnell followed an unusual litigation path because of a provi-
sion in BCRA that established an expedited process for judicial
review.1 3 . The case was heard by a three-judge panel of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, which included Cir-
cuit Court Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson, a George H.W. Bush
appointee, who presided; District Court Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, a
Clinton appointee; and District Court Judge Richard J. Leon, a George
W. Bush appointee. 4
The case was heard within eight months of filing, in keeping with
the expedited judicial review provision in the law, and included a paper
trail of deposition transcripts, written expert reports, and fact witness
affidavits, rather than live testimony in open court. Oral arguments were
held on December 4 and 5, 2002.15 On May 1, 2003, the district court
issued its decision. 6 The opinion was complex and splintered, and at
1,638 pages, 7 was the longest decision ever issued in the court's his-
tory. The court upheld major provisions of BCRA while striking down
and/or modifying the soft-money and issue advertising provisions.
18
After the district panel issued its decision, parties on both sides
filed notices of appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court and, pending review
by the Supreme Court, the defendants and many of the plaintiffs asked
the district court to stay all or part of its decision. 9 On May 19, 2003,
three weeks after the release of its lengthy decision, the district court
stayed its entire decision in McConnell, holding that BCRA's original
www.law.stanford.edu/library/campaignfinance/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2005); GS Campaign
Finance Reform, A Project at the Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/gs/cf/
cf_hp.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2005).
11. McConnell v. FEC, Civ. No. 02-582 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2002) (order consolidating cases),
available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/9.pdf.
i2. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93, 112.
13. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403, 116 Stat. 81, 113-
14.
14. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003).
15. See McConnell v. FEC, Civ. No. 02-582 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2002) (order scheduling oral
argument), available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/365.pdf.
16. McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 176.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. McConnell v. FEC, 253 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 2003).
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campaign rules should remain in place until the U.S. Supreme Court
rendered a judgment in the case.20 A two-judge majority (Judge Hen-
derson and Judge Kollar-Kotelly) imposed the stay because of a "desire
to prevent the litigants from facing potentially three different regulatory
regimes in a very short time span, and the Court's recognition of the
divisions among the panel about the constitutionality of the challenged
provisions," as defendants in the case had urged.2
III. McCoNNELL V. FEC: SUPREME COURT PROCEEDINGS
Both defendants and many of the plaintiffs in McConnell appealed
the case to the U.S. Supreme Court and urged the Court to set a swift
case schedule.22 The parties expressed a desire to have the nation's
campaign finance rules settled before the 2004 election cycle was in full
swing.23 The Supreme Court agreed with an expedited briefing sched-
ule.24 Under the Court's order, plaintiffs in the district court proceed-
ings, who continued as parties before the Supreme Court, filed their
main briefs on July 8, 2003.25 Seven amicus briefs were also filed by
current members of Congress, ten state Attorneys General, think tanks,
and individual citizens.26 The defendants filed their primary briefs one
month later,27 at which time 15 amicus briefs were also filed, including
briefs by state Attorneys General, current and former Members of Con-
gress, political scientists, advocacy organizations, civil rights organiza-
tions, and business leaders.2 8 Final "reply" briefs by the plaintiffs were
due on August 21, 2003.29
The Court heard the case in an unusually long four-hour oral argu-
ment on the morning of September 8, 2003.30 Two hours were given to
20. Id.
21. See id. at 21.
22. On May 23, 2003 the U.S. Solicitor General, along with the other government defendants
and the congressional sponsors of McCain-Feingold, filed a motion with the U.S. Supreme Court
to recommend several potential schedules for expedited briefing of McConnell v. FEC. A
response was filed by the McConnell plaintiffs on May 27, 2003. Both of these motions are
available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/McConnell-89.html.
23. Id.
24. McConnell v. FEC, No. 02-1674-ATX (June 5, 2003) (Supreme Court order noting
probable jurisdiction), available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/665.pdf.
25. Id.
26. A complete listing of amicus briefs filed in support of both the defendants and plaintiffs in
McConnell at the Supreme Court is available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/McConnell-
100.html.
27. See McConnell, No. 02-1674-ATX (Supreme Court order noting probable jurisdiction).
28. See supra note 26.
29. See McConnell, No. 02-1674-ATX (Supreme Court order noting probable jurisdiction).
30. Counsel of record for the McConnell plaintiffs who presented oral argument before the
Supreme Court included: Kenneth Starr, former U.S. Solicitor General, representing Senator
Mitch McConnell; Bobby Burchfield, attorney at Covington & Burling, representing the political
[Vol. 60:185
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the plaintiffs and two hours were accorded to the defendants, just as in
the landmark 1976 Supreme Court case Buckley v. Valeo.3 1 On Decem-
ber 10, 2003, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its opinion
in McConnell.
32
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN MCCONNELL V. FEC
33
The Supreme Court's decision in McConnell was the most impor-
tant Supreme Court campaign finance decision in a generation. The
Court upheld the constitutionality of BCRA with a few minor excep-
tions. The McConnell Court addressed at least three fundamental cam-
paign finance issues. First, the Court reaffirmed its position that
preventing real and apparent corruption is a constitutionally permissible
rationale for congressional regulation in this area. Second, the Court
held that the electioneering communications provisions of BCRA are
neither constitutionally vague nor overbroad; but, instead, create a clear
standard for regulation, and that the "express advocacy" test it partially
replaced was "functionally meaningless" and not constitutionally
required. Finally, the Court upheld the authority of Congress to prevent
circumvention of core campaign finance restrictions through enactment
of prophylactic measures aimed at abuses likely to occur in the future.
A. Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption
The majority of the Court, consisting of Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter, upheld BCRA's ban on
national political party soft-money fundraising and spending, as well as
state party soft-money spending in connection with federal elections.34
It ruled that preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption
party plaintiffs; Floyd Abrams of Cahill, Gordon & Reindel, representing Senator Mitch
McConnell; Laurence E. Gold of the AFL-CIO, representing the AFL-CIO; and Jay Sekulow of
the Southeastern Legal Foundation, representing the minor plaintiffs. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 1-2, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (No. 02-1674), available at http://
www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/922.pdf. Counsel of record for the defense who
presented oral argument before the Supreme Court included: Theodore Olsen, current U.S.
Solicitor General, representing the federal government defendants; Seth Waxman, former U.S.
Solicitor General representing the Congressional Intervenor defendants; and Paul Clement, deputy
U.S. Solicitor General, representing Federal Government Defendants.
31. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
32. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
33. Author relied on an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision produced by attorneys at
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, members of the defendants' legal team, in McConnell v. FEC. See
Democracy 21, Analysis of Supreme Court Decision Upholding Constitutionality of New
Campaign Finance Law (Dec. 11, 2003), available at http://www.democracy21.org/index.asp?
Type=BPR&SEC={OAD86D 15-CC6E-478D-AB7D-E351E4DB IB38}&DE={E662FE41-E8E1-
406B-B803-F9CCD34CBD8A}.
34. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 154, 173.
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remains a legitimate basis for congressional regulation of political con-
tributions and spending, and does not necessarily impermissibly restrict
the constitutionally-guaranteed right to free speech.35
The Court cited the substantial record set before it, which had been
compiled for the district court proceeding.3 6 This record included find-
ings from a Senate investigation into allegations of wrongdoing in the
1996 federal elections (known as the Thompson Committee Report),
37
discovery documents from the national political parties, and other
sources.38 The Court had an enormous record that convincingly demon-
strated that the political parties (and their corporate and labor donors)
had circumvented federal election regulations by using soft money for
get-out-the-vote efforts, generic party advertising, and so-called broad-
cast "issue ads" that were all designed to influence the outcome of fed-
eral elections.
The Court stated, "[t]he question for present purposes is whether
large soft-money contributions to national party committees have a cor-
rupting influence or give rise to the appearance of corruption. Both
common sense and the ample record in these cases confirm Congress'
belief that they do."3 9
Additional records cited by the Court, provided by several former
and current members of Congress, gave tremendous detail on how the
soft-money fundraising system worked-including which parties solic-
ited and what the donors thought they were receiving in exchange for
their contributions.4 ° The Court concluded, "[t]he evidence connects
soft money to manipulations of the legislative calendar, leading to Con-
gress' failure to enact, among other things, generic drug legislation, tort
reform, and tobacco legislation."'4
Beyond this direct evidence, the Court also found that some corrup-
tion cannot be "easily detected nor practical to criminalize," but that the
"best means of prevention is to identify and to remove the temptation.
The evidence set forth above, which is but a sampling of the reams of
disquieting evidence contained in the record, convincingly demonstrates
that soft-money contributions to political parties carry with them just
such temptation."42
35. Id. at 143-44.
36. Id. at 132-33.
37. STAFF OF S. COMM ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV'T AFFAIRS, 105TH CONG., FINAL REPORT
ON THE 1997 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION IN CONNECTION WITH 1996 FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS
(1997), available at http://www.senate.gov/-gov-affairs/sireport.htm.
38. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 128-29, 146, 150-52.
39. Id. at 145.
40. Id. at 149-52.
41. Id. at 150.
42. Id. at 153.
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The majority also acknowledged "important governmental inter-
ests"43 in limiting the appearance of corruption and protecting "'public
confidence in the electoral process,' "4 stating that "common sense and
the ample record"45 substantiate Congress's judgment that soft money
gives rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined in upholding the portion of
BCRA that prevents federal officeholders from raising or spending soft
money as a valid anti-circumvention measure that was narrowly drawn
to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal office-
holders and candidates.46
B. Electioneering Communications
The majority of the Court also upheld the electioneering communi-
cations provisions of BCRA, which prohibit corporate and labor funding
of certain candidate-specific advertisements that are run via broadcast,
cable, or satellite within thirty days of a primary or sixty days of a gen-
eral election, and are targeted to the candidate's electorate.47
Dating back to the Tillman Act of 1907,48 the Taft-Hartley Act of
1947,49 and the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA"),50 the
law has limited the rights of labor unions and corporations to participate
in federal elections. Corporations and labor unions are not permitted to
contribute to federal candidate campaigns or political party committees,
or to advocate the election or defeat of a federal candidate to the general
public.5'
In 1976, the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo52 reviewed the
broad contribution limitations on these non-political actors and decided
that the broad limitations did not meet the constitutional mandate that
there be adequate notice of what speech is or is not prohibited.5 3
Accordingly, the Court chose to save the broad language by narrowly
construing it to mean expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
federal candidate 4.5  The now-famous footnote fifty-two of Buckley
43. Id. at 169.
44. Id. at 136 (quoting FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982)).
45. Id. at 145.
46. Id. at 286, 308, 314.
47. Id. at 189-94.
48. Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864.
49. Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 304, 61 Stat. 136.
50. Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 3, 10 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000 &
Supp. II 2000)).
51. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b.
52. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
53. Id. at 39-51.
54. Id. at 43-44.
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listed words that could mean expressly advocating the election or defeat
of a federal candidate: "'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot
for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject.' ",55
The Court in Buckley also explained why a clear test is useful:
[flhe distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and
advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in
practical application. Candidates, especially incumbents, are inti-
mately tied to public issues involving legislative proposals and gov-
ernmental actions. Not only do candidates campaign on the basis of
their positions on various public issues, but campaigns themselves
generate issues of public interest.56
The result, post-Buckley, was a legal dispute about whether or not an
entity had to use the so-called "magic words," as detailed in Buckley, in
a communication in order for a court or enforcement agency to deter-
mine that the communication advocated the election or defeat of a
candidate.
A voluminous record introduced to the district court three-judge
panel as part of the McConnell proceedings reflected that by the end of
the 2000 federal election cycle, corporate and labor union funding, either
directly or through front groups established for election-influencing pur-
poses, supported advertisements that expressly advocated for or against
specific federal candidates. 7 This activity was not covered by pre-
BCRA law (FECA) because the advertisements did so without using the
so-called "magic words."58
55. Id. at 44. These have become known as the "magic words," although Buckley and
subsequent cases indicate that they do, not comprise an exhaustive list of terms that meet the
"express advocacy" definition. Id.; FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238,
249 (1986) ("The fact that this message is marginally less direct than 'Vote for Smith' does not
change its essential nature. The Edition goes beyond issue discussion to express electoral
advocacy."); FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850
(1987) (concluding that the express advocacy test in Buckley "does not draw a bright and
unambiguous line").
56. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42 (emphasis added).
57. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d. 176, 283 (D.D.C. 2003). Written testimonies
submitted to the U.S. District Court which addressed this matter included testimony by David B.
Magleby, Kenneth Goldstein, Jonathan Krasno, Frank Sorauf, and Douglas Bailey. For excerpts
of these testimonies see INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE BATTLE (Anthony Corrado, Thomas
Mann & Trevor Potter eds., 2003).
58. A 1999-2000 study conducted by the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University
of Pennsylvania estimated that more than $500 million was spent on issue advocacy in the 2000
election cycle. See ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR. OF THE UNIV. OF PENN., ISSUE ADVERTISING IN
THE 1999-2000 ELECION CYCLE 1 (2001), available at http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.
org/03_politicalcommunication/issueads/2001_1999-2000issueadvocacy.pdf. The Annenberg
report also indicated that the national party organizations were responsible for nearly $162 million
(32%) of the total spending. Id. at 4. While some advertisements and mailings were intended to
shape general public opinion on issues, most advertisements during the 2000 election were
targeted at supporting or opposing specific federal candidates. Professor David B. Magleby at
[Vol. 60:185
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The question before the Supreme Court on this matter became
whether the Buckley decision identified a constitutional standard that
speech could not be regulated, at least by non-political entities, without
express advocacy. The McConnell Court answered this question "no."
"The major premise of plaintiffs' challenge . . . [wais that Buckley drew
a constitutionally mandated line between express advocacy and so-called
issue advocacy, and that speakers possess an inviolable First Amend-
ment right to engage in the latter category of speech."59 The Supreme
Court unequivocally rejected that argument:
That position misapprehends our prior decisions, for the express
advocacy restriction was an endpoint of statutory interpretation, not a
first principle of constitutional law. In Buckley we . ..provided
examples of words of express advocacy, such as "'vote for,'
"'elect,' "'support,'" . . ."'defeat,'" [and] "'reject,'" and those
examples eventually gave rise to what is now known as the "magic
words" requirement.
[But] our decisions in Buckley and MCFL were specific to
the statutory language before us; they in no way drew a constitutional
boundary that forever fixed the permissible scope of provisions regu-
lating campaign-related speech.
Nor are we persuaded, independent of our precedents, that the
First Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express advocacy and
so-called issue advocacy. That notion cannot be squared with our
longstanding recognition that the presence or absence of magic words
cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech from a true
issue ad. Indeed, the unmistakable lesson from the record in this liti-
gation ... is that Buckley's magic-words requirement is functionally
meaningless. Not only can advertisers easily evade the line by
eschewing the use of magic words, but they would seldom choose to
use such words even if permitted. And although the resulting adver-
tisements do not urge the viewer to vote for or against a candidate in
Brigham Young University analyzed the impact of issue advocacy campaigns in the 2000
presidential primaries. He summarized his study by stating that:
The idea that most issue advocacy is not election-related is disproved by the data we
collected. Less than one-tenth (8.9 percent) of all communications we intercepted
were pure issue advocacy (had no reference to a candidate or the election). Rather
issue advocacy provides a powerful tool for agenda setting and candidate definition.
[W]hen issues are discussed in the context of an election and candidates' positions
are presented, compared, and judged, much of this communication is intended to
influence a vote. Although some groups legitimately present nonpartisan
information about candidates up for reelection, usually these communications are
thinly veiled advocacy.
DAVID B. MAGLEBY, GETTING INSIDE THE OUTSIDE CAMPAIGN 4, 26 (2000).
59. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 190 (2003).
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so many words, they are no less clearly intended to influence the
election.60
The Court concluded that the "unmistakable lesson from the
record" was that the "magic-words requirement is functionally meaning-
less,' ' 6 and that "corporations and unions used soft money to finance a
virtual torrent of televised election-related ads during the periods imme-
diately preceding federal elections, and that remedial legislation was
needed to staunch that flow of money."62 The Court held that BCRA
implemented a clear standard in regards to electioneering communica-
tions that was neither vague nor overbroad and would not encroach on
other forms of speech.63
C. McConnell Court's Approval of Attempts by Congress to Prevent
Circumvention of the Law
Another important aspect of the majority opinion of the Supreme
Court in McConnell is the Court's holding that Congress has adequate
constitutional authority (consistent with the First Amendment) to pre-
vent circumvention of federal election laws and to protect the process
from the corrosive influence of large unregulated contributions from
corporations, labor unions, and wealthy individuals. The Court con-
cluded its opinion by stating:
Many years ago we observed that "[t]o say that Congress is
without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard . . .an
election from the improper use of money to influence the result is to
deny the nation in a vital particular the power of self-protection." We
abide by the conviction in considering Congress' most recent effort to
confine the ill effects of aggregated wealth on our political system.64
The McConnell Court acknowledged that it is not only permissible,
but important, that Congress counter attempts at circumvention of cam-
paign finance laws. The majority of the Court wrote that Congress
needs to respond to changes in the practices of campaign finance and
that the jurisprudence is flexible enough to have Congress continue to
draft regulation as it deems necessary:
The less rigorous standard of review we have applied to contribution
limits... shows proper deference to Congress' ability to weigh com-
peting constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular
expertise. It also provides Congress with sufficient room to antici-
pate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations
60. Id. at 190-93 (citations and footnote omitted).
61. Id. at 193.
62. Id. at 207.
63. Id. at 184.
64. Id. at 223-24 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 60:185
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designed to protect the integrity of the political process. 61
The Supreme Court's McConnell decision makes clear that Congress
may and should legislate in the future to close any loopholes in, and to
prevent circumvention of, federal campaign finance law.
V. THE REACTION TO MCCONNELL AND THE RISE OF 527s IN THE
2004 ELECTION
As a result of congressional passage of BCRA, upheld by the
Supreme Court in McConnell, individuals are now limited in what they
can donate to national party committees, and labor unions and corpora-
tions are prohibited from donating. But during the 2004 election cycle
immediately following the Court's decision in McConnell, a number of
pseudo-party committees and organizations were created for the sole
purpose of influencing the presidential election. Some groups were cre-
ated with the active approval and participation of party officials. Four of
the most prominent new organizations were America Coming Together
("ACT") and The Media Fund on the Democratic side, and Swift Boat
Veterans for Truth and Progress for America on the Republican side.
The President of ACT, Ellen Malcolm, also head of EMILY's List,
stated that ACT intended to conduct a "massive get-out-the-vote opera-
tion that we think will defeat George W. Bush in 2004."66 The Media
Fund was lead by Harold Ickes, formerly of the Clinton White House
and then a member of the executive committee of the DNC. 67 The Swift
Boat Veterans exclusively targeted Senator Kerry and were advised by
Bush re-election campaign counsel Benjamin Ginsberg.68 Ginsberg
resigned from his service to the Bush-Cheney 2004 campaign once it
was made public that he worked for both the campaign and Swift Boat
Veterans. 69 Ginsberg also served as counsel to Progress for America, a
conservative advocacy group.7 ° Progress for America was headed by
Tony Feather, one of President Bush's leading "Pioneer" fundraisers and
political director for his first presidential campaign.71
One important aspect of the 2004 election cycle was the amount of
money raised by these groups that was donated by a very limited number
65. Id. at 137.
66. Thomas B. Edsall, Liberals Form Fund to Defeat President, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2003,
at A3.
67. Eliza Newlin Carney, Peter H. Stone & James A. Barnes, New Rules of the Game, 35
NAT'L J. 3800 (2003).
68. Glen Justice & Jim Rutenberg, Advocacy Groups and Campaigns: An Uneasy Shuttle,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2004, at Al.
69. Id.
70. Lisa Getter, GOP Can't Beat '3rd Party' Groups, So It Forms Them, L.A. TIMES, June 6,
2004, at A20.
71. Peter H. Stone, Republican 527s: Full Steam Ahead, 36 NAT'L J. 1719 (2004).
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of wealthy individuals. Forty-four percent (nearly $106 million) of the
funding of the top Democratic-leaning 527 organizations active in the
federal election came from only fourteen wealthy individuals. 72 Forty-
four percent ($40.45 million) of the receipts of Republican-leaning orga-
nizations active in the federal election came from only eleven wealthy
individuals.73
These groups and others formed during the 2004 election are often
referred to as "527 organizations," named for the section of the Internal
Revenue Code that governs tax treatment of certain political organiza-
tions.7 1 Section 527 of the tax code creates tax-exempt status for organi-
zations "organized and operated primarily" for the purpose of
influencing the selection or election of individuals to public office.75
Virtually all political committees-candidate committees, party commit-
tees, or PACs-are registered with the IRS under section 527 and have a
"major purpose" to engage in election-related activity.76
The congressional sponsors of BCRA and many campaign finance
reform organizations believe that pre-BCRA federal campaign finance
law requires any political organization with a major purpose to influence
specific federal elections, and which spends more than $1,000 doing so,
to register as a political committee with the FEC and only use federal
funds for its election-related activities.77 The congressional sponsors of
BCRA urged the FEC to write regulations to enforce this law,78 but the
Commission failed to do so during the 2004 election cycle.
A. FECA, Buckley, McConnell, and the "Major Purpose" Test
Regulation of "political committees" by campaign finance law
began with the passage of FECA.79 According to FECA, a "political
72. Campaign Legal Center: New 2004 Party and 527 Numbers, http://
www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/1300.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2005).
73. Id.
74. 26 U.S.C. § 527 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
75. Id.
76. See id. § 527(e)(2). Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code governs the tax treatment
of "political organizations" organized and operated primarily for the purpose of influencing the
selection of candidates to elected or appointed office. Virtually all political committees-
candidate committees, party committees, and PACs-are registered with the IRS under § 527. By
comparison, lobbying organizations and state ballot measure committees operated primarily to
influence public debate on issues and not candidates are typically operated under § 501(c)(4) of
the tax code.
77. See Letter from Sen. John McCain, Sen. Russell D. Feingold, Rep. Christopher Shays, &
Rep. Marty Meehan, to Mai T. Dinh (Apr. 9, 2004), available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.
org/attachments/1 113.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Sen. John McCain] (formal comments filed
with the FEC regarding 527 regulations).
78. Id.
79. The FECA of 1971 defined the term "political committee" for the first time. Pub. L. No.
92-225, § 301(d), 86 Stat. 3, 11 (1972) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (2000 & Supp. II
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committee" is any group that receives "contributions" or makes
"expenditures" exceeding $1,000 per year.8° A "contribution" or
"expenditure" is any gift or payment made "for the purpose of influenc-
ing any election for Federal office."'"
The Supreme Court later added in Buckley that a group is not a
"political committee" unless its "major purpose" is to influence federal
elections.8 2 This construction of the term "political committee," as
applied to non-candidate organizations, has come to be known as the
"major purpose" test, but has never been incorporated into the statutory
definition of "political committee" by Congress.83 The Court held that
Congress may constitutionally require disclosure of all payments made
by political committees for the purpose of influencing federal elec-
tions-i.e., "expenditures"-because such expenditures are "by defini-
tion, campaign related."84
Although the Court in Buckley held that all payments by political
committees for the purpose of influencing a federal election are subject
to FECA disclosure requirements, the Buckley Court construed the term
"expenditure" more narrowly as it applies to groups without the major
purpose of influencing federal elections, so as to include only expendi-
tures for communication that expressly advocates a candidate's election
or defeat.85
Thus, according to FECA as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Buckley, any group that spends more than $1,000 in a year and has as its
major purpose the influencing of a federal election should be considered
a political committee. As a political committee, the group is required to:
register with the FEC;8 6 accept only limited hard-money contributions;87
not accept contributions from corporations and labor unions;88 and fol-
low stringent reporting requirements.89
2002)). The political contribution and expenditure reporting requirements applicable to political
committees, established by the FECA of 1971, constitute the first regulation of political committee
activity. §§ 302-09, 86 Stat. 3, 12-19 (current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 432-34). Federal
regulation of political committee activity has expanded over the past thirty-five years, to include
contribution limits, solicitation restrictions, advertising disclaimers, and various other restrictions.
The term "political committee" is now referenced throughout federal campaign finance statutes
and regulations hundreds, if not thousands, of times.
80. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (2000).
81. Id. § 431(8)-(9) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
82. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976).
83. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(4).
84. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.
85. See id. at 79-80.
86. 2 U.S.C. § 433 (2000).
87. Id. § 441a(a)(1) (Supp. II 2002).
88. Id. § 441b (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
89. Id. § 434 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
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Many 527 organizations active in the past few election cycles qual-
ify as political committees under this two-part test. First, nearly all 527s
receive contributions or make expenditures far in excess of $1,000. Sec-
ond, many 527 organizations clearly have as a "major purpose" to influ-
ence a federal election. 527 organizations, like America Coming
Together, Moveon.org, and the Swift Boat Veterans, were openly
focused on defeating or electing a presidential candidate in 2004.90
Thus, it is the long-standing FECA definition of "political commit-
tee," as construed by the Supreme Court in Buckley using the "major
purpose" test, that reformers argue should be enforced by the FEC so as
to regulate 527 organization activity. Congressional enactment of
BCRA in 2002 did not alter the definition of "political committee" or
the "major purpose" test. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in McCon-
nell implicitly affirmed the continuing applicability of the "major pur-
pose" test when it referred to the "major purpose" language in the
Buckley opinion.9"
B. FEC Inaction and the Potential for Congressional Regulation or
Court Rulings
In part due to the multi-million-dollar donations by wealthy indi-
viduals to select 527 organizations campaigning in the 2004 federal elec-
tion, the congressional sponsors of BCRA urged the FEC to draft
regulations to enforce the law in regards to section 527 groups with a
"major purpose" to impact federal elections.92 The FEC reopened an
inactive rulemaking, asked for public comment, and held public hearings
on the matter.93 After a postponement of 90 days (by this time it was
too late in the 2004 election cycle for any rules to be applied to the on-
going activity), the FEC finally rejected its own General Counsel's rec-
ommendation on the regulation of 527 organizations and took no action
to bring section 527s into compliance with campaign finance laws.94 It
90. See, e.g., Kate Biber, George $oros Sell-Outs, REC., Nov. 20, 2003, http://
www.hlrecord.org/media/paper609/news/2003/11/20/Opinion/George.oros.SellOuts-564380.shtml
(stating that ACT affirmed that it "will conduct a massive voter contact program, mobilizing
voters to defeat George W. Bush"); Moveon.org, Bush in 30 Seconds, http://www.moveon.org/
bushin30seconds/aboutus.html (last visited June 29, 2005) (explaining that Moveon.org's mission
is to "create and run powerful political ads in swing states to challenge President Bush's policies
and his administration").
91. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 170 n.64 (2003) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 79 (1976)).
92. Letter from Sen. John McCain, supra note 77.
93. See Political Committee Status, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 2004-6, 69 Fed. Reg.
11,736 (Mar. 11, 2004).
94. See FEC Draft Final Rules for Political Committee Status, Agenda Document 04-75
(Aug. 19, 2004), available at http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2004/mtgdoc04-75.pdf; see also Minutes
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deadlocked in a 3-3 vote on whether to continue to look at the issue in
August 2004, but the Commission did adopt a rule specifying hard and
soft-money allocation ratios for 527 organizations that took effect on
January 1, 2005. 95
The FEC's inaction spurred two lawsuits against the Commission
for its failure to draft new rules to regulate 527 organizations and bring
them under compliance with existing campaign finance law. One suit
was brought by U.S. Representatives Marty Meehan (D-MA) and Chris-
topher Shays (R-CT).96 Another was filed by President Bush.97 These
cases were merged98 and are still pending before the court; oral argu-
ment was held December 13, 2005.
Congress has also turned its attention to regulation of 527 commit-
tees in light of the FEC's unwillingness to regulate them. Two opposing
bills have been presented in the House and one companion bill has been
introduced in the Senate. 99
Representatives Shays and Meehan and Senators McCain (R-AZ)
and Feingold (D-WI) have introduced the 527 Reform Act, which would
require all 527 organizations to register as federal political committees
with the FEC unless they fall under a group of specified exceptions.o
The exceptions include small groups and groups exclusively involved in
state rather than federal election activity.'' Once an organization regis-
ters as a federal political committee, activities such as the broadcast of
advertisements mentioning only federal candidates would need to be
paid for exclusively with hard money.102 The proposed legislation also
sets new allocation rules to ensure that activities affecting both federal
and state or local elections are funded by at least fifty percent federal
hard money.' 3 Lastly, the legislation limits contributions acceptable for
nonfederal accounts to $25,000 per year, and prohibits union or corpo-
rate funds from being contributed to those nonfederal accounts of sec-
of an Open Meeting of the Federal Election Commission, at 7-10 (Aug. 19, 2004) (minutes
approved Sept. 9, 2004), available at http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2004/approve04-77.pdf.
95. See Political Committee Status, Definition of Contribution, and Allocation for Separate
Segregated Funds and Nonconnected Committees, 69 Fed. Reg. 68,056 (Nov. 23, 2004) (to be
codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 102, 104, and 106).
96. Shays v. FEC, No. 04-1597 (D.D.C. 2004).
97. Bush-Cheney '04, Inc. v. FEC, No. 04-1612 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2004).
98. Shays v. FEC, No. 04-1597, Bush-Cheney '04, Inc. v. FEC, No. 04-1612 (D.D.C. Feb. 22,
2005) (order consolidating cases).
99. 527 Fairness Act of 2005, H.R. 1316, 109th Cong. (2005); 527 Reform Act of 2005, H.R.
513, 109th Cong. (2005); 527 Reform Act of 2005, S. 271, 109th Cong. (2005).
100. S. 271 § 2.
101. Id.
102. Id. § 3.
103. Id.
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tion 527 organizations.'0 4 The bill exclusively applies to organizations




The Pence-Wynn proposal, called the 527 Fairness Act, does not
directly address regulation of 527 organizations as its title implies, but
rather, would repeal many long-standing provisions of campaign finance
law, including significant portions of BCRA's soft-money ban. Specifi-
cally, it would authorize federal candidates and office holders to solicit
and directly control the spending of these unlimited contributions to
their political parties to support their campaigns. °6 The Pence-Wynn
bill also proposes a six-fold increase in the amount an individual can
contribute to a party committee and federal candidate.o 7
The question now is will the Congress, the FEC, or the courts be
first to address this issue and others that continue to arise in this ever-
evolving section of law.
104. Id.
105. Id. at § 2.
106. H.R. 1316, § 3.
107. Id. at §§ 4 (donations to political committees), 5 (donations to federal candidates).
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